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OPINION 
________________ 
 
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
*  Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Circuit Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting 
by designation. 
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 Colbert Thompson pled guilty to distribution of fewer 
than five grams of crack cocaine, but his sentencing range was 
ultimately calculated based on his classification as a career 
offender.  After the United States Sentencing Commission 
issued a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines 
that lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses, 
Thompson moved to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2).  He conceded, however, that United States v. 
Mateo, 560 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009), foreclosed his argument, 
and the District Court denied the motion.  On appeal, Thompson 
requests that the panel reconsider Mateo in light of Freeman v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).  We conclude that Mateo 
remains good law and therefore will affirm. 
I 
 In 2002, Thompson was indicted on two counts, and pled 
guilty to one, of distributing fewer than five grams of crack 
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Because 
Thompson had two prior felony convictions, he qualified for 
treatment as a career offender under the Guidelines.  See U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.1 (2002).1
                                                 
1 The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 
used the 2002 edition of the Guidelines Manual B the version in 
effect at the time of Thompson’s conviction B to calculate 
Thompson’s Guidelines range.  Except where noted otherwise, 
that is the edition used in this opinion. 
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 This was consequential.  The Guideline for career 
offenders has its own sentencing ranges, with offense levels 
determined by reference to the statutory maximum sentences 
authorized for various offenses of conviction.  See id.  If the 
career offender offense level “is greater than the offense level 
otherwise applicable, the offense level from the [career 
offender] table . . . shall apply.”  Id. § 4B1.1(b).  In Thompson’s 
case, the career offender offense level was much greater than the 
offense level “otherwise applicable” B that is, the offense level 
for distribution of fewer than five grams of crack cocaine.  As 
calculated by the Probation Office in its PSR, Thompson’s crack 
cocaine offense yielded a base offense level of 20, see id. 
§ 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(10); his career offender offense level was 32, 
see id. § 4B1.1(b)(3) (listing an offense level of 32 for offenses 
with a statutory maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment); 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (providing for a 20-year maximum for the 
crack cocaine offense to which Thompson pled guilty).  Thus, in 
effect, Thompson’s career offender offense level made his crack 
cocaine base offense level irrelevant. 
  The career offender designation altered Thompson’s 
Guidelines range in another respect, too.  According to the PSR, 
Thompson’s prior criminal convictions resulted in a criminal 
history score of 12 and a criminal history category of V.  See 
U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).  But, as a career 
offender, Thompson was assigned a criminal history category of 
VI.  See id. § 4B1.1(b) (mandating a criminal history category of 
VI for career criminals). 
 Based on a total offense level of 292
                                                 
2  Thompson’s base offense level of 32 was reduced by 
three levels to reflect his acceptance of responsibility.  See 
 and a criminal 
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history category of VI, Thompson’s Guidelines range was 
determined to be 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.  See id. ch. 
5, pt. A (sentencing table).  Had Thompson not been classified 
as a career offender, his Guidelines range would have been 46 to 
57 months.  See id. 
 At sentencing, Thompson’s counsel requested a 
downward departure on the ground that the career offender 
designation over-represented his prior record.  The District 
Court denied that request and sentenced Thompson to 151 
months in prison, the bottom of the career offender range.  
Thompson appealed.  This Court affirmed the District Court’s 
designation of Thompson as a career criminal and otherwise 
dismissed the appeal.  United States v. Thompson, 88 F. App’x 
480 (3d Cir. 2004). 
  In 2008, the Sentencing Commission retroactively 
reduced the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses.  See 
U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 706 (Nov. 2010) (effective Nov. 1, 
2007) (adjusting Guidelines); id. amend. 713 (effective Mar. 3, 
2008) (making Amendment 706 retroactive).  The following 
year, in Mateo, we considered whether a crack cocaine offender 
sentenced as a career offender was eligible for a sentence 
reduction based on the recent Guidelines amendment to crack 
cocaine offense levels.  We concluded that he was not.  Mateo, 
560 F.3d at 156.  To be eligible for a reduction in sentence 
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), a defendant must have “been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  That means, we 
                                                                                                             
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). 
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said, that a § 3582(c)(2) reduction is available only if the 
Guidelines amendment has “the effect of lowering the 
sentencing range actually used at sentencing.”  Mateo, 560 F.3d 
at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  
The crack cocaine amendment had no effect on Mateo’s 
sentencing range:  it altered the calculation of the base offense 
level for his crack cocaine offense, but not the calculation of the 
career offender Guidelines range actually used to compute his 
Guidelines sentence.  Accordingly, we held that § 3582(c)(2) 
relief was unavailable to Mateo.  Id. at 156. 
 In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Freeman, a case 
concerning the availability of § 3582(c)(2) relief based on the 
crack cocaine amendment to the Guidelines.  After Freeman 
was decided, Thompson filed a motion to reduce his sentence 
under § 3582(c)(2).  He conceded that Mateo foreclosed his 
motion, but argued that Mateo should be revisited in light of 
Freeman.  Bound by Mateo, the District Court denied 
Thompson’s motion.  This timely appeal followed. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  The single issue in this case B whether, given Freeman, 
we should overrule Mateo B is a question of law over which we 
exercise plenary review.  United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 
252, 257 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III 
 Thompson concedes that Mateo controls this case.  As in 
Mateo, Thompson was convicted of a crack cocaine offense; as 
there, Thompson’s sentencing range was ultimately calculated 
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based on his status as a career offender rather than as a crack 
cocaine offender.  Thompson asks us to reconsider Mateo 
because, he contends, both the plurality and concurring opinions 
in Freeman “called Mateo’s narrow interpretation of the 
statutory meaning of ‘based on’ into question.”  We do not 
agree. 
 In Freeman, the defendant had entered a guilty plea 
pursuant to a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).  Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2691.  Such an 
agreement allows the parties to bind the district court to a 
pre-agreed sentence if the court accepts the plea.  See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (a sentence or sentencing range 
“recommendation or request [under this provision] binds the 
court once the court accepts the plea agreement”).  The question 
in Freeman was whether a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement can be “based on” a sentencing 
range within the meaning of § 3582(c)(2).  Freeman, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2691. 
  The question divided the Court.  Justice Kennedy, writing 
for four Justices, delivered the judgment of the Court that a 
defendant can be eligible for such relief.  Id. at 2690 (Kennedy, 
J.).  But the plurality’s rationale differed markedly from that of 
Justice Sotomayor, who concurred in the judgment and supplied 
the necessary fifth vote.  See id. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  Justice Kennedy wrote that a sentence imposed 
pursuant to a binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement is still “based 
on” a Guidelines sentencing range, as long as “the sentencing 
range in question was a relevant part of the analytic framework 
the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the 
agreement.”  Id. at 2692-93 (Kennedy, J.).  Even in the context 
of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, the defendant’s Guidelines 
8 
 
range matters:  it informs the judge’s “decision to accept the 
plea,” a decision that entails “impos[ing] the recommended 
sentence.”  Id. at 2690; see id. at 2692 (stating that the relevant 
Guidelines policy statement “forbids the district judge to accept 
an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement without first evaluating the 
recommended sentence in light of the defendant’s applicable 
sentencing range”).  Justice Kennedy concluded that “the district 
court has authority to entertain § 3582(c)(2) motions when 
sentences are imposed in light of the Guidelines, even if the 
defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement.”  Id. at 2693. 
 Justice Sotomayor took a different approach.  In her 
view, “the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court 
pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) . . . is ‘based on’ the agreement 
itself, not on the judge’s calculation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”  Id. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  But she 
identified two exceptions: (1) where the plea agreement itself 
“call[s] for the defendant to be sentenced within a particular 
Guidelines sentencing range,” or (2) where it makes clear that 
“the basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range 
applicable to the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty.” 
 Id. at 2697.  Because Freeman’s plea agreement clearly stated 
that his sentence would be “determined pursuant to the 
Sentencing Guidelines,” and recommended a sentence that was 
“evident[ly]” based on the figure at the bottom end of Freeman’s 
Guidelines range, his plea agreement satisfied an exception to 
Justice Sotomayor’s general rule.  Id. at 2699-2700.  She 
therefore concurred in the judgment.  Id. 
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IV 
 As a three-judge panel we are, of course, obliged to 
follow prior decisions of our Court, except “when the prior 
decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision.”  United 
States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009).  To determine 
whether Mateo conflicts with Freeman in any respect, we must 
first decide which opinion in Freeman controls. 
  In a splintered Supreme Court decision where “no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.”  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The 
standard established in Marks is designed “to promote 
predictability in the law by ensuring lower court adherence to 
Supreme Court precedent.”  Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 
220 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Its 
objective is “that, whenever possible, there be a single legal 
standard for the lower courts to apply in similar cases and that 
this standard, when properly applied, produce results with which 
a majority of the Justices in the case articulating the standard 
would agree.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Even so, 
Marks applies only “where one opinion can be meaningfully 
regarded as ‘narrower’ than another and can represent a 
common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.”  Berwind Corp. 
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 307 F.3d 222, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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 Applying these principles, in Jackson, we concluded that 
“the Marks framework applies where one opinion is clearly 
‘narrower’ than another, that is, where one opinion would 
always lead to the same result that a broader opinion would 
reach.”  Jackson, 594 F.3d at 222.  Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence in Freeman conforms to that description.  “[T]he 
[Freeman] plurality would surely agree that in every case in 
which a defendant’s [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] plea agreement satisfies 
the criteria for Justice Sotomayor’s exception by expressly using 
a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense 
to establish the term of imprisonment, the sentencing judge’s 
decision to accept that sentence is based on the guidelines.”  
United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 F.3d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 
2011) (internal citation, quotation marks, and alterations 
omitted).  The converse, however, is not true; sentences imposed 
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements will frequently be 
eligible for § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions under Justice 
Kennedy’s framework, but ineligible for reductions under 
Justice Sotomayor’s. 
 We therefore conclude, as has every other circuit to 
consider the question, that, because Justice Sotomayor’s opinion 
is narrower than Justice Kennedy’s, it expresses the holding of 
the Court.  See United States v. Austin, 676 F.3d 924, 926 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Rivera-Martinez, 665 F.3d at 345; United States v. 
Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Smith, 658 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. White, 
429 F. App’x 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2011) (unpublished). 
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V 
 Having decided that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence is 
the opinion that binds us, we have little difficulty concluding 
that Mateo’s interpretation and application of § 3582(c)(2) is 
consistent with it.  Section 3582(c)(2) authorizes a sentence 
reduction if the defendant was sentenced “based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  In her concurrence, 
Justice Sotomayor parsed this rule into two parts:  first, the 
sentence must be “based on” a Guidelines range; second, a 
Guidelines amendment must have the “effect of lowering” that 
Guidelines range.  See Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2700 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Thompson argues that Freeman’s and Mateo’s analyses 
of the first part cannot be squared.  We disagree; the two 
decisions simply addressed different questions about that 
condition for relief.  Freeman dealt with one interpretive 
question: whether a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement can be “based on” a sentencing 
range at all.  See id.  Mateo addressed another:  whether a 
sentence can be “based on” a sentencing range other than the 
range actually used at sentencing. 
 In evaluating this question in Mateo, we examined the 
phrase “based on a sentencing range” in its context.  See Mateo, 
560 F.3d at 155.  We decided that “the term ‘sentencing range’ 
clearly contemplates the end result of the overall guideline 
calculus, not the series of tentative results reached at various 
interim steps in the performance of that calculus.”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(alterations omitted)).  Therefore the salient sentencing range 
was the one “actually used at sentencing.”  Id. (internal 
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quotation marks omitted).  To meet the first condition of 
§ 3582(c)(2), a defendant’s sentence must be based on the 
actual, calculated Guidelines range upon which the district court 
relied at sentencing.3
  Our reading of § 3582(c)(2) in Mateo is fully consistent 
with Justice Sotomayor’s understanding that a sentence “based 
on” a Guidelines sentencing range is one where the “range 
serves as the basis or foundation for the term of imprisonment.” 
 See Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
Justice Sotomayor did not suggest that more than one Guidelines 
range could serve as the “basis or foundation” of the sentence, 
and the range that fits her definition best is the one at the end of 
the court’s Guidelines calculation, not one of its “tentative 
results” along the way.
 
4
                                                 
3 Thompson’s counsel asserted at oral argument that 
Mateo conflated its analysis of the two conditions.  That is not 
so.  We did say in Mateo that, “pursuant to the statute, if an 
amended guideline does not have the effect of lowering the 
sentencing range actually used at sentencing, the defendant’s 
sentence was not based on that range within the intendment of 
the statute.”  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  But all we meant by this was the rather obvious 
proposition that, if an amendment does not lower the Guidelines 
range used at sentencing, the sentence cannot have been based 
on a “sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by 
the Sentencing Commission.”  Thompson’s real objection is to 
Mateo’s defining the term “sentencing range” as “the end result 
of the overall guideline calculus.”  Freeman does not call that 
definition into doubt. 
 
4 In a Rule 28(j) letter submitted after oral argument, 
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 In sum, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion provides no reason 
to overrule Mateo.  Mateo therefore remains binding on this 
panel, and it requires that we affirm the District Court’s denial 
of § 3582(c)(2) relief.5
                                                                                                             
Thompson contends that the recently-decided case of United 
States v. Jackson, 2012 WL 1592624 (6th Cir. May 8, 2012), 
supports his contention that Freeman should be read as 
overruling Mateo.  In Jackson, the Sixth Circuit held that a 
sentence can be “based on” more than one guidelines sentencing 
range.  In that case the District Court departed downward from 
the career offender range and further commented that the 
disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offense 
levels was “untenable” and “really doesn’t have any empirical 
support,” id. at *2, and “reveal[ed] that Jackson’s sentence was 
plainly ‘based on,’ at least in part, the crack guidelines,” id. at 
*3.  Assuming without deciding that Jackson was correctly 
decided, it has no bearing on this case.  Here, there was no 
downward departure B nothing to signal that the District Court 
had imposed a sentence based on anything other than the 
applicable career offender sentencing range. 
 
5 Thompson also relies on Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion, as well as on Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence.  But 
even if the plurality opinion controlled, Thompson would not 
prevail.  Justice Kennedy said that “§ 3582(c)(2) modification 
proceedings” should be available “to whatever extent the 
sentencing range in question was a relevant part of the analytic 
framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to 
approve the agreement,” but he recognized that the sentencing 
range was “relevant” only if it had an effect on the sentence.  
Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2692-93; id. at 2692 (stating that the 
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point of § 3582(c)(2) is to “isolate whatever marginal effect the 
since-rejected Guidelines range had on the defendant’s 
sentence”).  Here, the crack cocaine Guidelines range had no 
effect on Thompson’s sentence.  The calculation of Thompson’s 
range may have begun with the relevant crack cocaine offense 
level, but that preliminary step lost all significance once 
Thompson was designated as a career offender and the career 
offender base offense level was applied.  Where the starting 
point of the sentencing analysis leads to a dead end, it might in 
some semantic sense be a “part” of the analytic framework used 
to determine the sentence, but it is not a relevant part. 
 
Thompson argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A) made 
the crack cocaine base offense level relevant, by requiring the 
sentencing judge to consider the Guidelines range which would 
have applied had Thompson not been a career offender.  We 
disagree.  Section 3553(a)(4)(A) does nothing more than instruct 
the sentencing judge to consider the calculated Guidelines range 
for that defendant B which was arrived at here without reference 
to the crack cocaine base offense level.  See United States v. 
Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 327 n.27 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing 
§ 3553(a)(4) as requiring the sentencing judge to consider the 
“applicable sentencing range”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) 
(“the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the 
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless” it finds that certain 
circumstances warrant departure from it). 
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CONCLUSION 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court denying Thompson’s motion for a reduction of 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
